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ing existing privilege schemes, ultimately finding that most exclude student journalists. This poses a unique problem because, as one commentator put it, “[i]f we’re going to ask students to fulfill the responsibility of
being front-line newsgatherers, the least we can do is send them out into
the field with the confidence of meaningful legal protection.” With that
in mind, the Article offers solutions and calls for legislative action, arguing that student journalists need more than a paper shield to fulfill
their editorial responsibilities. This is the first comprehensive scholarly
analysis of these issues.
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INTRODUCTION
The facts of the landmark Supreme Court case Branzburg v.
Hayes,1 which addressed whether requiring journalists to testify
before grand juries abridged the First Amendment, are well known
to media attorneys and legal scholars: Louisville Courier-Journal
reporter Paul Branzburg observed two young people make and use
marijuana and hashish, and wrote news articles about his experience and local drug use generally.2 He promised confidentiality to
his sources and later refused to reveal their identities before a state
grand jury.3 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant
Branzburg—or any other reporter—a First Amendment-based privilege to refuse to testify under those circumstances.4 However,
the concurring and dissenting opinions laid the foundation for such
a privilege and outlined how it would work5 in language that has
found its way into numerous statutes, court decisions, and procedural rules—all potential bases today for a reporter to claim a privilege from being compelled to testify about, or otherwise produce,
their confidential sources or information.6
1

408 U.S. 665 (1972). In the companion cases of In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass.
1971), and Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), which were
consolidated into Branzburg v. Hayes, two other reporters, each covering the Black
Panther organization, were subpoenaed to testify before grand juries and reveal
information that they had received in confidence. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672–73, 675.
Like Branzburg, the reporters refused. Id.
2
Id. at 667–68.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 667 (“The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and
testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.”).
5
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
6
Jonathan Peters, Shield Laws and Journalist’s Privilege: The Basics Every Reporter
Should Know, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/united_
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But what if Paul Branzburg, instead of working as a full-time
professional journalist for an established newspaper, was a seventeen-year-old student journalist working today for the East High
Courier? Imagine he reports a story about teacher misconduct that
lands him before a state grand jury, where he is ordered to reveal
his confidential sources. Would he have to comply? Or what if
Branzburg was a college sophomore writing his first piece for the
Daily Collegian? Imagine that he reports that a high-ranking administrator once embezzled funds, and the paper receives a subpoena
from state prosecutors to obtain his unpublished notes. Would he
have to provide them? In either case, could Branzburg as a student
journalist reasonably expect to be protected by a state reporter’s
privilege? Probably not.
While the majority of states offer some protections for journalists to shield their confidential sources, the protections usually do
not extend to student journalists—either because the students do
not qualify for them, or the qualifying criteria are so unclear that
student journalists could not reasonably expect to be covered.7
This is problematic because of the importance of student journalists’ work. The gathering, production, and dissemination of news is
increasingly dispersed,8 and as traditional outlets have adapted to
changing circumstances and challenging economics, student jour-

states_project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php [https://perma.cc/B8R8M5AG].
7
See infra Section II.A.
8
See Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American
Journalism, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov./Dec. 2009), http://archives.cjr.org/
reconstruction/the_reconstruction_of_american.php
[https://perma.cc/2S23-3D7F]
(“[T]he economic foundation of the nation’s newspapers, long supported by advertising,
is collapsing, and newspapers themselves, which have been the country’s chief source of
independent reporting, are shrinking . . . . Commercial television news, which was long
the chief rival of printed newspapers, has also been losing its audience, its advertising
revenue, and its reporting resources. Newspapers and television news are not going to
vanish in the foreseeable future, despite frequent predictions of their imminent
extinction. But they will play diminished roles in an emerging and still rapidly changing
world of digital journalism, in which the means of news reporting are being re-invented,
the character of news is being reconstructed, and reporting is being distributed across a
greater number and variety of news organizations, new and old.”).
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nalists have played a vital role in meeting their communities’ needs
for news and information.9
For example, student journalists in Kansas recently published
an investigative story showing that their newly hired principal
lacked the credentials she claimed to have: “[The students] called
government offices, dredged databases, interviewed people, and
conducted international conference calls—all while some district
officials . . . stood by the principal.”10 But eventually the principal
resigned, and professional journalists worldwide praised the students’ reporting.11 Two years ago, in New Jersey, student journalists brought to light misconduct complaints against a superintendent.12 And at Northwestern University, undergraduate journalism
students produced a series of reports that led to the exoneration of
seven Illinois prisoners, three of whom were under death sentences.13 As Frank LoMonte, executive director of the Student
Press Law Center, a nonprofit based in Washington, D.C., put it:
“If [we are] going to ask students to fulfill the responsibility of being front-line newsgatherers, . . . the least we can do is send them
out into the field with the confidence of meaningful legal protection.”14
With that in mind, this Article explores whether and how state
reporter’s privilege protections cover student journalists, focusing
on three typical sources of the privilege: statutes, constitutions, and
9

Jonathan Peters & Frank LoMonte, College Journalists Need Free Speech More than
Ever, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/
college-journalists-need-free-speech-more-than-ever/273634 [https://perma.cc/K568BDQN].
10
Jonathan Peters, How Kansas High School Journalists Exposed a Principal’s Puffed-up
Resume, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.cjr.org/united_states_
project/kansas_high_school_newspaper.php [https://perma.cc/7MVF-EFKT].
11
Id.
12
SPLC Case File: High School Reporter’s Investigative Article Was Censored for Three
Months for Using Anonymous Sources, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 23, 2015, 4:44 PM),
http://www.splc.org/article/2015/12/splc-case-files-northern-highlands-regional-highschool [https://perma.cc/EA3C-YT8Y].
13
Rob Warden, The Revolutionary Role of Journalism in Identifying and Rectifying
Wrongful Convictions, 70 UMKC L. REV. 803, 845 (2002).
14
Jonathan Peters, How a New Campaign Is Trying to Strengthen the Rights of Student
Journalists, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/united_
states_project/new_voices_campaign.php [https://perma.cc/VQM5-NT9K].
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the common law. Part I explains the theoretical basis for recognizing a reporter’s privilege, and discusses both Branzburg and its
progeny, which offer useful background information for understanding the context in which state protections have developed.
Part I also reviews the scholarly literature on state reporter’s privilege protections. Part II analyzes the state protections and considers how they apply to student journalists. It analyzes statutes, cases
interpreting statutes, cases interpreting constitutional provisions,
and the common law. Part III concludes with comments on the
growing and ever-important population of student journalists and
the need to enhance their privilege protections. It offers some solutions, and it calls for legislative action. This is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of these issues.
I. THE BASICS OF A REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE
Any person ordered to testify at a legal proceeding is generally
required to comply.15 If the person refuses, he or she may be subject to a judicial finding of contempt.16 There are, however, exceptions called privileges.17 The best known is probably the attorneyclient privilege, which exempts attorneys from testifying about
their confidential communications with clients.18 Many states recognize similar privileges for medical doctors, psychological therapists, religious advisors, and spouses.19 These privileges are all based

15

See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (stating that the First
Amendment does not “relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by all
citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal
investigation”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690–91 (1972) (finding that “the
public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings”
outweighs the burden on news gathering); United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 493
(4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Branzburg Court declined to treat reporters differently from all
other citizens who are compelled to give evidence of criminal activity . . . .”).
16
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
17
See generally Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
18
See id.; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law.”).
19
See Privilege, supra note 17.
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on the belief that there is a public interest justifying the exclusion
of testimony.20
In all but one state, journalists may claim a privilege of some
kind to protect themselves from legal efforts to compel their testimony about confidential sources or information.21 The privilege’s
rationale is that journalists rely on sources to provide the information they publish, and some sources will not share sensitive information without a promise of anonymity. Consider what Time magazine’s Matthew Cooper wrote in a July 2005 affidavit, filed in a
privilege dispute:
I could not effectively report on matters of concern
to the public—war, peace, the budget—without using confidential sources; nor could any of my colleagues at Time magazine. Many newsworthy stories
come to me from people—some connected with the
Administration, some not—who make it clear to me
that they will not offer the information to me unless
I can promise them that their identities will remain
secret. This is widely understood to be the case not
just for myself but for journalists at all major publications . . . . By promising confidentiality to [those
sources who demand it], I am able to report on
many things that would otherwise go unreported.22
The reporter’s privilege, then, recognizes that there is a public
interest in encouraging the disclosure of newsworthy information.
It also recognizes that the press’s credibility depends on its actual
and perceived independence.23 As one of the authors of this Article
20

See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“[The] purpose [of the attorney-client privilege] is
to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”).
21
See infra Part II.
22
Brief of Appellants Judith Miller, Matthew Cooper and Time Inc. at 15, In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-3138, 04-3139, 043140) (quoting affidavit of Matthew Cooper).
23
Cathy Packer, Confidential Sources and Information, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
LAW 321, 325 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2009) (“When police and prosecutors rely on
journalists for information, they make the media an arm of law enforcement, although that
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previously noted: “If journalists are, or are seen as, investigative
arms of the government or private interests, . . . the public might
lose faith in their reporting and be loath to trust them with information.”24
Privileges, which vary from one state to the next, are found in
multiple sources. Lower courts have invoked Branzburg to recognize a qualified First Amendment-based privilege,25 but there is
currently no analogous federal shield statute.26 At the state level,
depending on the jurisdiction, journalists can claim the privilege
under a state statute27 or a state’s common law28 or under the state
or federal constitution.29 The scope of their protections varies, so it
is necessary to assess several issues to determine whether a privilege will protect a journalist in a particular case.30
Some state privileges, for example, protect only confidential
sources and information,31 while others protect information regardless of its confidentiality.32 Many privileges are subject to exceptions or balancing tests that enable the party compelling disclosure
to overcome the privilege in limited circumstances (say, in criminal
cases where the offense is punishable by life imprisonment and the
information sought is essential to the proceeding).33 And, most importantly for this Article, the threshold question in a privilege claim
is not their proper role in a democracy and undermines their credibility with sources.
Journalists are supposed to be watchdogs of law enforcement.”).
24
Peters, supra note 6.
25
See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); LaRouche
v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d
705, 710–11 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d
583, 595–99 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th
Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977).
26
RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of
Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 586 (2008) (“For more than
thirty years, a legislative battle has raged over the need for a federal shield law for
journalists.”).
27
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2016).
28
See, e.g., Sinnott v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988).
29
See, e.g., In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985).
30
Peters, supra note 6.
31
See, e.g., 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (2016).
32
See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701–16-4704 (2016).
33
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (2016).
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is whether the privilege applies to the claimant. In other words: Is
the person a journalist as defined by the privilege’s source? Some
schemes are narrow and cover employees of traditional news organizations,34 while others are broad and extend to bloggers, researchers, freelancers, filmmakers, and book authors.35 But what
about student journalists?
A. Few More Words About Branzburg
Branzburg and its progeny offer useful background information
to understand the context in which state reporter’s privileges have
developed. Branzburg consolidated the cases In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, in which prosecutors subpoenaed two different reporters covering the Black Panther Party.36 The prosecutors
charged party leaders with various crimes and wanted the reporters
to testify before grand juries about party activities. The reporters,
Paul Pappas and Earl Caldwell, refused to testify.37 They argued
that the First Amendment protected them from compelled disclosure of their sources’ identities, asserting that if they were forced
to disclose, then all sources would be reluctant to speak to reporters, and the free flow of information would suffer as a result.38
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Byron White, ruled that a journalist has the same duty as all
other citizens to testify when called upon.39 However, Justice Lewis F. Powell, the fifth vote to reject the privilege based on Branzburg’s facts, refused to go that far.40 In a concurring opinion, he left
open the possibility that the First Amendment might protect a reporter under other circumstances:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on
its facts by the striking of a proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citi34

See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2015).
See, e.g., In re Jan. 11, 2013 Subpoena by Grand Jury of Union Cty., 75 A.3d 1260,
1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).
36
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 672–77 (1972).
37
Id. at 672–73, 675.
38
Id. at 679–80.
39
Id. at 690–91.
40
Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
35
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zens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis
accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions. In short, the courts will be
available to newsmen under circumstances where
legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.41
Justice Potter Stewart, in dissent, expanded on those ideas and
explained how a reporter’s privilege would work, reasoning that a
reporter’s right to a confidential relationship with his source stems
“from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the public.”42 He added that “the right to publish is central
to the First Amendment and basic to the existence of constitutional
democracy,” concluding that the “corollary of the right to publish
must be the right to gather news.”43 Justice Stewart also outlined
three criteria the government must satisfy to subpoena a reporter:
The government must demonstrate that (1) “the information
sought is clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry,” (2) “it is reasonable to think the witness in question has that information,” and (3) “there is not any means of obtaining the information less destructive of First Amendment liberties.”44
By reading Justice Powell’s concurrence as a check on the majority, and by mining Justice Stewart’s dissent for guidance to apply the privilege, lower courts have relied on Branzburg’s fractured
opinions to recognize a qualified First Amendment-based privilege.45 But courts have struggled to resolve the key issue of who
41

Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 725–26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
43
Id. at 727.
44
Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
45
See Stephen Bates, Overruling a Higher Court: The Goodale Gambit and Branzburg v.
Hayes, 14 NEXUS 17, 18 (2009) (“No longer did Branzburg reject a reporter’s privilege; it
created one. Lower courts generally cited the Powell concurring opinion for the
proposition that reporters are entitled to some sort of privilege, and then applied the test
from the Stewart dissent.”); see also Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the
Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1951–52 (2006).
42
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qualifies as a journalist.46 Notably, this struggle was predicted by
the Branzburg majority, which stated:
The administration of a constitutional newsman’s
privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be
necessary to define those categories of newsmen
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as
much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.47
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in the case In
re Madden, engaged in this type of “questionable procedure,” establishing a multi-part test that requires anyone asserting the privilege to satisfy three elements.48 The court held that “individuals
are journalists when engaged in investigative reporting, gathering
news, and have the intent at the beginning of the news-gathering
process to disseminate this information to the public.”49 Thus, the
test requires courts to define “two equally complex concepts: investigative reporting and news,”50 both of which the Third Circuit
failed to define.51

46

William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 663 (2006). Other issues include: whether protection should
extend only to a source’s identity or also to unpublished information; whether the
privilege protects a reporter’s notes, outtakes, and similar unpublished materials; whether
the privilege protects information possessed by third parties, like telephone companies;
whether procedural mechanisms should be in place for asserting or overcoming the
privilege; and whether the source may waive the privilege. Id.
47
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703–04.
48
151 F.3d 125, 128–30 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703–04).
49
Id. at 130. Professor Clay Calvert summarized the test as follows: “(1) the claimant
was engaged in investigative reporting; (2) the claimant was gathering news; and (3) the
claimant possessed the intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to
disseminate the news to the public.” Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?:
Wrestling with a Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 426 (1999).
50
Calvert, supra note 49, at 426.
51
In re Madden, 151 F.3d at 130.
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Two other circuits have taken similar approaches. In von Bulow
v. von Bulow, the Second Circuit held that “the individual claiming
the privilege must demonstrate, through competent evidence, the
intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the
inception of the newsgathering process.”52 The court further noted
that the person invoking the privilege need not be a member of the
“institutionalized press,” as long as she is engaged in “activities
traditionally associated with the gathering and dissemination of
news.”53 In Shoen v. Shoen, the Ninth Circuit found the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in von Bulow to be persuasive, stating that a
“journalist’s privilege is designed to protect investigative reporting.”54 The court focused on the activities of the person invoking
the privilege, explaining that “what makes journalism journalism is
not its format but its content.”55 Thus, the court concluded that
the privilege protects information gathered in pursuit of news, but
it did not define what constitutes news.56 Instead, the court simply
acknowledged the importance of “bringing to light ‘newsworthy’
facts on topical and controversial matters of great public importance.”57
These leading cases define a journalist by way of journalism,
and set forth four general principles: (1) the medium does not determine whether the claimant is a journalist; (2) the claimant’s intent is important, because he/she must seek to disseminate information to the public; (3) the claimant’s activities are important, too,
because he/she must be engaged in investigative reporting; and (4)
the content disseminated must be news.58 The third and fourth
principles raise additional questions: What is investigative reporting, and what is news? No post-Branzburg court has answered
these questions fully, but relevant cases adopt the view that investigative reporting involves people who conduct interviews, analyze
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 142.
5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Calvert, supra note 49, at 430–31 (emphasis added).
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information, and make recommendations; and news involves the
corresponding use of quotes, analysis, and recommendations.59
B. Scholarly Literature on State Shield Privileges
This review focuses on recent scholarly works on state statutory, constitutional, and common-law reporter’s privilege protections. To begin, some commentators have focused on the value or
quality of speech to determine if it should be protected. Media law
professors Jason Martin and Anthony Fargo, along with media lawyer Mark Caramanica, expressed concern in 2011 over news organizations that use state shield laws to protect anonymous commenters’ speech at the expense of potentially defamed or injured plaintiffs.60 The authors urged news organizations to exercise restraint
when defending anonymous commenters who post on their websites,61 advising the organizations to assess the value of commenters’ speech and adjust their defenses accordingly.62 The authors
noted that states could alleviate plaintiffs’ concerns by amending
their shield laws to narrow the scope of their protections, though it
is rare for states to do so.63 More commonly, states amend their
shields to provide more protections; Maryland’s statute, which now
explicitly includes college journalists, is a prime example.64
Opinions vary on whether reporter’s privileges should be expansively or narrowly drafted—and whether they should be recognized at all. Brad A. Greenberg, a visting fellow at Yale Law
School,65 warned that support for a federal shield law could ignore
59

Jonathan Peters & Edson C. Tandoc, Jr., “People Who Aren’t Really Reporters at All,
Who Have No Professional Qualifications”: Defining a Journalist and Deciding Who May
Claim the Privileges, 2013 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 34, 49.
60
See Jason A. Martin, Mark R. Caramanica & Anthony L. Fargo, Anonymous Speakers
and Confidential Sources: Using Shield Laws When They Overlap Online, 16 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 89 (2011).
61
Id. at 125.
62
Id. at 123–24 (“[C]ourts in anonymous comment cases have already differentiated
between ‘higher value’ and ‘lower value’ speech, mostly in the context of anonymity
being used to conceal copyright violators, persons making threats, or persons engaged in
commercial speech.”).
63
Id. at 119–20.
64
Id. at 119; see infra Section II.A.
65
Brad Greenberg, YALE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.yale.edu/brad-greenberg
[https://perma.cc/AL8T-VYHP] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
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greater threats to the independent judiciary.66 He pointed out that
shield laws are not a panacea: “Press advocates should not simply
see some shield as superior to no shield. If a shield law is to ensure
the free flow of information to the public, it must account for the
costs and benefits of what is covered and what is not.”67
Other commentators have focused on model shield laws, with
one calling Branzburg “a model of muddle”68 and proposing a state
statute that represents a sort of blended approach: absolute protection for sources and qualified protection for information, subject to
a test not unlike the one outlined in Justice Stewart’s dissent.69
That commentator also used student-friendly language to define
journalists70—an issue this Article discusses later.71
Another commentator asserted that bloggers should have their
own shield laws based on the theory that bloggers work within a
horizontal (peer-to-peer) editorial scheme, while full-time professional journalists work within a vertical (editor-to-reporter)
scheme.72 “Courts might best promote the free flow of informa66

Brad A. Greenberg, The Federal Media Shield Law Folly, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 437
(2013).
67
Id at 451. Greenberg added that it might be more advantageous to journalists to limit
the third-party doctrine, which arose in the context of telephony and is agnostic as to the
content: “This [doctrine] poses a problem for the free flow of information because
sources have no guarantee that a reporter can keep their identity secret. In fact, a reporter
attributing leaked information to an anonymous source invites government investigators
to execute a search warrant on that report’s phone logs.” Id. at 449.
68
Joshua A. Faucette, Note, Your Secret’s Safe with Me . . . Or So You Think: How the
States Have Cashed in on Branzburg’s “Blank Check,” 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 183, 197 (2009)
(“Overall, Branzburg and its ‘blank check’ to the states have been nothing more than a
model of muddle because the decision failed to give the states any guidance as to what
type of privilege a reporter’s shield law should grant to newsgatherers.”).
69
However, Faucette’s proposal suggested a lower standard for Justice Stewart’s third
prong—the need for information should be “reasonable,” rather than “compelling and
overriding.” Id. at 232.
70
Id. at 230 (“Any person associated, employed, or regularly engaged, connected or
affiliated for personal, pecuniary, or financial gain with a newspaper or media organization
that publishes or broadcasts at regular intervals or has a general circulation shall fall under
the protection of this Act.”).
71
See infra Part II.
72
Benjamin J. Wischnowski, Note, Bloggers with Shields: Reconciling the Blogosphere’s
Intrinsic Editorial Process with Traditional Concepts of Media Accountability, 97 IOWA L. REV.
327, 330–31 (2011).
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tion,” he argued, “by distinguishing the different forms of investigative journalism as a definitional matter and judging them accordingly.”73 He warned that ignoring the technical nuances between
bloggers and full-time professional journalists would create the risk
of judicial overprotection for bloggers by granting all-encompassing
reporter protections to bloggers who perform only informational,
as opposed to investigative, functions.74
Several commentators have suggested drafting narrower shield
statutes in the hope of allaying legislative concerns. One stressed,
for example, that a federal shield bill would not pass if it defined
journalists broadly, pointing out that earlier versions failed because
of politicians’ fears of the difficulty of defining a journalist.75 He
argued: “[T]he traditional press is most in need of statutory protections, and it would be unwise to burden the bill with provisions
that protect persons beyond this group.”76 He added that “clear
lines must separate journalists from amateur writers,”77 a philosophy that would exclude bloggers, non-traditional reporters, and
student journalists.
To a significant degree, that kind of narrowness is already a reality. After analyzing various state shield statutes, media law professors Erik Ugland and Jennifer Henderson concluded that the
statutes and their judicial interpretations “reflect[] . . . an expert
conception of the press.”78 It is evident in statutory and judicial
references to money and employment, meaning the claimaint must
demonstrate that he or she is employed as a journalist or earns

73

Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 343; see also Jill Laptosky, Protecting the Cloak and Dagger with an Illusory Shield:
How the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Falls Short, 62 FED. COMM. L. J. 402, 434
(2010) (suggesting that the Free Flow of Information Act should provide for the balancing
of competing interests, such as protecting the free flow of information versus compelling
disclosure in a court setting).
75
Scott Neinas, Comment, A Skinny Shield Is Better: Why Congress Should Propose a
Federal Reporters’ Shield Statute That Narrowly Defines Journalists, 40 U. TOL. L. REV.
225, 238 (2008).
76
Id. at 226.
77
Id. at 238.
78
Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does It Matter?
Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241, 248 (2007).
74
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money doing journalism.79 Meanwhile, media law professor Jonathan Peters (one of the authors of this Article) and Edson Tandoc,
a media scholar in Singapore, found that a major part of being a
journalist is a social role: serving the public welfare by reporting on
issues and events central to society’s well-being in matters of
health, safety, economics, and politics.80 They wrote:
From contributors to CNN iReport . . . to reporters
at the New York Times, all are capable of gathering,
processing, and disseminating news and information
to serve the public interest. Some do it better than
others, some have more resources than others, and
something is gained when reporting is done by stable organizations with money, logistics, and legal
services—but all are capable.81
For these reasons, they said “an elitist conception of a journalist” that focuses on income or employment would offend the spirit
of the First Amendment, “which protects both the institutional
press and the lonely pamphleteer.”82 But Martin and Fargo, noted
above, call for a narrow definition, arguing:
Whether it is better, for bloggers and other nontraditional journalists, that a statute is vague or specific in defining who is covered by the law is not as
clear as one would think. While it would seem logical to assume that specificity is a commendable trait
in a statute, that may not always be the case with
press shield laws . . . . [B]ecause the journalist’s privilege, or any other privilege for that matter, limits
the testimony that might be obtained in a court of
law or similar proceedings, the privilege should be
narrowly interpreted. Statutes that specify which
media or persons may invoke the privilege may in-

79
80
81
82

Id. at 248–51.
Peters & Tandoc, supra note 59, at 61.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 61.
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advertently deny the privilege to persons or media
not named in the law. 83
As courts consider the privilege’s purpose and scope, the issue
of definition is at the forefront. The following sections of this Article explore an increasingly important component of the privilege:
whether and how state reporter’s privilege protections cover student journalists, concentrating on statutory, constitutional, and
common-law sources.
II. ARE STUDENT JOURNALISTS COVERED?
Currently, forty states and the District of Columbia recognize a
reporter’s privilege either in statutory form or in a functionally
equivalent rule of evidence adopted by the state supreme court.84
Nine of the other ten states have recognized the privilege through
their common law or the state or federal constitution,85 leaving
83

Jason A. Martin & Anthony L. Fargo, Rebooting Shield Laws: Updating Journalist’s
Privilege to Reflect the Realities of Digital Newsgathering, 24 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47,
65–66 (2013).
84
ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2016); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (2016);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2016); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2016); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-146t (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 164701 to 16-4704 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2016);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (2016); IND. CODE §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2
(2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-480 to 60-485 (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100
(West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1459 (2016); ME. REV. tit. 16, § 61 (2016);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 767.5a (2016); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1901 to 26-1-903 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.275 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West 2016); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2016); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2016); N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(B); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04,
2739.12 (LexisNexis 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (2016); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 44.510–44.540 (2015); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (2016); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.11 to 9-19.1-3 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN § 19-11-100 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208
(2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 22.021–22.027 (West 2015); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2015); UTAH R. EVID. 509(a); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.68.010 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2016).
85
In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985); Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v.
Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97, 101–03 (Iowa 2002); Sinnott v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 524
N.E.2d 100, 586–87 (Mass. 1988); State ex. rel. Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650,
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Wyoming as the lone state without any kind of reporter’s privilege.86 As noted above, the privilege’s scope varies from one state
to the next, as does the definition of a journalist.87 This Part reviews relevant statutes, cases, and the common law, and concludes
that the privilege usually does not extend to student journalists—
either because students do not qualify for the protections, or the
qualifying criteria are so unclear that student journalists could not
reasonably expect to satisfy them.
A. Statutes and Cases Interpreting Statutes
To determine whether state shield statutes and rules protect
student journalists, the authors grouped the statutes and rules into
ten categories, based on the scope of their coverage and how they
define a journalist. The categories range from student journalists are
explicitly covered, to covered person must be a professional journalist.
Within each category, the statutes and rules are arranged chronologically by the year each one was enacted. The authors interpreted
the statutes and rules using a textualist approach, which “posits
that once [a court] has ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant.”88
655–56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502–03 (N.H. 1982); Hopewell
v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995); State v. St. Peter, 315
A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974);
Shield Laws, 11 STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., no. 3, 1990, at 28, 29 (citng two court decisions
in Mississippi that recognized a reporter’s qualified privilege).
86
Reporter’s Privilege Guide: Rhode Island – Wyoming, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 5,
2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2014/12/reporters-privilege-guide-4
[https://perma.cc/S2GC-US9U].
87
Id.
88
William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990)
(exploring the rise of textualism through the ascension of Justice Scalia to the Supreme
Court). As Professior Eskridge commented, there is an “analytic condundrum” at the
heart of any court’s statutory interpretation:
The statute’s text is the most important consideration in statutory
interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given effect. Yet the
meaning of a text critically depends upon its surrounding context.
Sometimes that context will suggest a meaning at war with the
apparent contextual meaning suggested by the statute’s language.
How should the judge proceed? Is contextual evidence even
admissible in such cases? How can it be excluded?
Id. at 621.
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The late Justice Antonin Scalia was perhaps the Supreme
Court’s most ardent defender of the textualist approach.89 In his
view, if a statute’s meaning was clear, it would be a derogation of
the court’s duty to consult legislative history or other texts to interpret the statute.90 In that sense, Scalia’s textualism was part and
parcel of the balance of powers: Congress should not dictate judicial review with directive legislative history, and courts should not
impose un-enacted but preferred policy outcomes contained in language from legislative history with the intent or effect of undermining legislative will.91
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, in contrast, attempted to clarify his own philosophy on statutory interpretation in
an article in which he quoted another circuit judge, who stated:
“The enemy is not legislative records—it is bad legislative
records.”92 Although he admitted that he is a “notorious opponent
of legislative history,”93 Judge Easterbrook rejected the “plain
meaning” notion of statutory interpretation, arguing that “[i]n interesting cases, meaning is not ‘plain’; it must be imputed; and the
choice among meanings must have a footing more solid than a dictionary.”94 So, the traditional textual approach that relies on outside sources, such as dictionaries, is not the mode of interpretation
that Judge Easterbrook would embrace.
Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito follows a modified textualist
approach that allows for discussions of context: The text is supreme, but legislative history can be consulted to establish the con-

89

Id. at 623.
Id. (“Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of this
doctrine [that legislative history can sometimes trump plain meaning], that is to my mind
an ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is
clear, that language must be given effect—at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.”
(quoting Immigration and Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
91
Id. at 654.
92
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61–62 (1994) (quoting Abner J. Mikva, Statutory
Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 982 (1989)).
93
Id. at 62.
94
Id. at 67.
90
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text in which the text should be read.95 One commentator, comparing the textualist approaches of the justices on the bench, described
Justice Scalia’s approach as “ambiguity-avoiding” and Justice Alito’s approach as “ambiguity-seeking,” adding that the latter would
consult legislative history if it would aid him in “seeing all possible
interpretations and choosing the correct one.”96 On the other
hand, Justice Scalia creatively interpreted the rules of grammar and
statutory construction to eliminate the need to consult legislative
history.97 Thus, with textualism on the rise,98 this Article follows
Justice Scalia’s approach—hewing closely to the text and using
rules of grammar and construction to illuminate it—to determine
whether, and how, the shield statutes cover student journalists.
1. Student Journalists Are Explicitly Covered
Student journalists are explicitly covered in two state statutes:
Maryland and West Virginia.99 The Maryland shield protects “any
person who is, or has been . . . [e]nrolled as a student in an institution of postsecondary education and engaged in any news gathering
or news disseminating capacity recognized by the institution as a
scholastic activity.”100 This statute makes two important distinctions. First, it covers students only at postsecondary institutions,
excluding high school and middle school students.101 Second, the
statute appears to distinguish student journalists, who often are
affiliated with an independent student media outlet, and journalism
students, who often write and report for a class.102 Counterintui95

Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation,
30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2007).
96
Id. at 998.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court
and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L. J. 484, 507 (2014) (suggesting that, in an
analysis of courts’ increasing uses starting in the 1980s of dictionary definitions in their
opinions, “[o]ne possible explanation for the rise in Supreme Court dictionary usage is
that both originalism and textualism gained major intellectual currency around the same
time”).
99
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2016); W. VA. CODE § 57-310 (2016).
100
§ 9-112(b)(3).
101
See id.
102
See id.
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tively, a first-year journalism student who is subpoenaed in connection with a story posted on a class blog is likely to have an easier
time claiming the privilege than a student journalist writing for an
independent campus newspaper with a much larger circulation.
In comparison, the West Virginia shield protects anyone who
“regularly” produces “news . . . that concerns matters of public
interest for dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of
the person’s livelihood.”103 Protection extends to “a student reporter at an accredited educational institution who meets all of the
requirements, except that his or her reporting may not provide a
portion of his or her livelihood.”104 This raises several questions.
For example, what about an “educational institution” that is not
“accredited”? Presumably, its students are not covered. But accreditation exists at different levels: universities are accredited,
schools are accredited, and so on.105 Therefore, it is unclear whether a student journalist would be covered if, say, an unaccredited
communications program housed the news organization where the
student worked, but the university as a whole was accredited.
Furthermore, the West Virginia statute is unclear on its protection for students whose reporting does “provide a portion of his or
her livelihood.”106 Some are paid for their work, and some receive

103

§ 57-3-10(a).
Id.
105
See generally Understanding Accreditation of U.S. Colleges and Universities,
PETERSON’S (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.petersons.com/college-search/us-collegesuniversities-accreditation.aspx#/sweeps-modal
[https://perma.cc/W974-M8MQ]
(“Accreditation is a form of endorsement that colleges and universities use to let
potential students know that their program offers a valid education that is officially
recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. Earning an accreditation in the United
States is a voluntary, nongovernmental process. Schools request to be evaluated and/or
have their programs evaluated by an independent accrediting agency. The agency sets its
own standards that the school must meet in order to earn their accreditation, and since
accrediting agencies vary in their quality standards, some are considered more prestigious
than others. Accrediting agencies are private educational associations. The standards they
set and which types of colleges and universities they accredit are entirely up to them, thus
there are agencies that are specific to certain fields of study, such as engineering or
medical schools . . . . Some schools can carry multiple accreditations which cover some or
all of their programs.”).
106
See § 57-3-10.
104
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scholarships for it.107 The key is whether the word “may,” which
has multiple meanings, is read to express possibility or to deny permission. If it is read to express possibility (“except that [it is possible for]
his or her reporting . . . not [to] provide a portion of his or her livelihood”), the privilege would apply to money-earning student journalists. If it is read to deny permission (“except that his or her reporting [must] not provide a portion of his or her livelihood”), the
privilege would not apply to money-earning student journalists unless they qualified as regular journalists under the other statutory
provision—a tall order because of the “substantial” reference in
that provision. At this time, there are no West Virginia cases addressing these issues.
2. Noncommercial Educational Broadcasters Covered
Explicitly
One of Ohio’s two shield laws protects from compelled disclosure any “person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or
employed by any noncommercial educational or commercial radio
broadcasting station, or any noncommercial educational or commercial television broadcasting station” for the purpose of producing news.108 That is broad enough to apply to student journalists.
And while that statute conspicuously omits newspapers,109 a separate statute provides similar protections to individuals working
with or for a newspaper.110 However, Ohio law does not clearly include school-affiliated papers in that statute, creating an open question of whether they—and the people who work for them—are
protected under the shield.111 No case law addresses these issues.

107

See, e.g., Scholarships, NEW ENG. NEWSPAPER & PRESS ASS’N., http://
www.nenpa.com/story/scholarships [https://perma.cc/EBE3-SR4G] (last visited Feb. 7,
2017); Scholarships, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS FOUND., http://
rtdna.org/content/scholarships [https://perma.cc/3BF2-LZZN] (last visited Feb. 7,
2017) (requiring work samples for eligibility for the scholarship).
108
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (LexisNexis 2016).
109
See id.
110
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2016).
111
See id. (“No person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any
newspaper or any press association for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling,
editing, disseminating, or publishing news shall be required to disclose . . . .”).
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3. Covered Person/Entity Loosely Defined
Four statutes cover a type of person and/or entity but do not
provide clear definitions of them, leaving open the possibility for a
student journalist to claim protection.112 First, the Alaska shield
refers to a “reporter,”113 as does the Illinois statute.114 Meanwhile,
the Maine shield refers to a “journalist,”115 and the Washington
law covers “the news media.”116 These statutes—with the exception of Maine’s, which offers no definition of a journalist117—define
their terms in relation to conducting business as a journalist, or being employed as one. Schools may treat student journalists as volunteers or enrolled students, rather than employees, so it is possible these statutes would not cover students. The outcome depends
112

See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (2016); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-901
to 5/8-909 (2016); ME. REV. tit. 16, § 61 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2016).
113
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390. A “reporter” is defined as “a person
regularly engaged in the business of collecting or writing news for publication, or
presentation to the public, through a news organization; it includes persons who were
reporters at the time of the communication, though not at the time of the claim of
privilege.” § 09.25.390(4).
114
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-901. A “reporter” is defined as “any person regularly
engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a
news medium on a full-time or part-time basis; and includes any person who was a
reporter at the time the information sought was procured or obtained.” Id. § 5/8-902(a).
115
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 61.1.
116
WASH. REV. CODE. § 5.68.010(1). “News media” is defined as:
(a) Any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher,
news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network,
cable or satellite station or network, or audio or audiovisual
production company, or any entity that is in the regular business of
news gathering and disseminating news or information to the public
by any means, including, but not limited to, print, broadcast,
photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic distribution;
(b) Any person who is or has been an employee, agent, or
independent contractor of any entity listed in (a) of this subsection,
who is or has been engaged in bona fide news gathering for such
entity, and who obtained or prepared the news or information that is
sought while serving in that capacity; or
(c) Any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the entities listed in (a) or (b)
of this subsection to the extent that the subpoena or other compulsory
process seeks news or information described in subsection (1) of this
section.
§ 5.68.010(5).
117
See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 61.
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on how the student media define their “business,” and manage
their student “employees.”
4. Person Is Engaged with or Connected to News Media, But
Is Not Necessarily Employed
This is the largest category of statutes, containing ten that define a covered person as someone engaged with, or connected to,
the news media.118 Student journalists may be protected under
these statutes. For example, Alabama’s applies to those “engaged
in, connected with or employed” by a news organization,119 while
California’s applies to a “publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon” a news outlet.120 Meanwhile, the Arkansas law covers “any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical, radio station, television station, or
Internet news source.”121 The Kentucky shield, in contrast, protects any person who has obtained information for the purpose of
publishing it “in a newspaper or [broadcasting it] by a radio or television station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which
he is connected.”122 Finally, Arizona’s law covers any person “engaged in newspaper, radio, television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by” a news outlet.123 The remaining statutes in this group—those of Pennsylvania,124 Montana,125 Michigan,126 Tennessee,127 and North Dakota128—all follow a similar pattern.
118

ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2016); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-85-510 (2016); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.100 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1901 to 26-1-903 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2016); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5942 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2016).
119
ALA. CODE. § 12-21-142.
120
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; see also CAL CONST. art. 1, § 2 (b) (providing the same
language as the statute).
121
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510.
122
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100.
123
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237.
124
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (2016).
125
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1) (2015).
126
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a(1) (2016).
127
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2016).
128
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2016).
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5. Covered Person Is Engaged in Producing News for the
Public
This category includes seven shields that may cover student
journalists,129 although the case is not an easy one because of the
inclusion of “the public” as the audience for a journalist’s work.
For example, the Minnesota shield covers any person “directly engaged” in the gathering or production of “information for . . . the
purpose of dissemination to the public.”130 Similarly, the Nebraska
shield covers “those who gather, write, or edit information for the
public.”131 Oregon protects any “person connected with, employed
by or engaged in any medium of communication to the public.”132
And the Georgia shield covers “any person, company, or other entity engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for the public.”133 Again, the remaining laws—those of South Carolina,134
Wisconsin,135 and Utah, which is a rule of evidence136—follow suit.
The courts in these states have not interpreted “public” as it relates to student journalists, so it remains to be seen how students
would fare, based on the audiences for their work.
6. Covered Person Must Produce News for the General Public
These statutes go a step farther than those in the previous
group by insisting that covered persons disseminate news to the
general public.137 This would be a difficult bar for some student
journalists to reach. The New Jersey shield, for example, covers
any “person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed
by news media for the purpose of” disseminating news to the

129

See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2016); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2016);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–44.540 (2015);
S.C. CODE ANN § 19-11-100 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2016).
130
MINN. STAT. § 595.023.
131
NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144.
132
OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1).
133
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508.
134
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A).
135
WIS. STAT. § 885.14(a) (2016).
136
UTAH R. EVID. 509(a).
137
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-53.11 (2016).
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“general public.”138 Although the Superior Court of New Jersey
construed the law to apply to bloggers,139 the court tailored its analysis to whether a blogger qualified as a journalist, rather than interpreting the term “general public.”140 Similarly, the North Carolina
shield protects various people connected with a “news medium,”
defined as any “entity regularly engaged in the business of publication or distribution of news . . . to the general public.”141 It is difficult to imagine that a student journalist producing news for a primarily high school audience would be seen as addressing the general public, but it is a closer call for student journalists producing
news for a college or university campus, where in some places the
campus and greater community are one and the same. With that in
mind, high school journalists probably would not be covered, but
some college journalists would be.
7. Publication Frequency, Paying Readership, and
Accreditation
These statutes require some connection to a news organization
and provide strict definitions of what constitutes a legitimate (i.e.,
covered) organization.142 Most student journalists would have
trouble claiming to contribute to a news organization so defined.
For example, the Indiana shield protects people “connected with”
a newspaper or news periodical “issued at regular intervals and
having a general circulation.”143
Likewise, the Louisiana law applies to reporters “connected
with any news media,” defined as “any newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals and having a paid general circulation.”144 Some student media, especially at the high-school level,
138

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.
In re Jan. 11, 2013 Subpoena by Grand Jury of Union Cty., N.J., 75 A.3d 1260, 1271
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).
140
Id. at 1272.
141
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(3).
142
See IND. CODE §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–
45:1459 (2016); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (2016).
143
IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1(1).
144
LA. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451. A Louisiana appellate court found that a weekly
newspaper owner and editor qualified as a reporter, despite the owner’s claims that he
“was not acting as a ‘reporter.’” Becnel v. Lucia, 420 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (La. Ct. App.
139
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do not publish at regular intervals; and most student media, at all
levels, do not have a paid general circulation. Student journalists
working for such media would not qualify for the privilege.
The New Mexico shield, which is actually a rule of evidence,
covers any “person engaged or employed by news media for the
purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing,
or disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf
news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited, or
disseminated.”145 It includes exceptions for parties that can prove
they need access to the withheld information.146
And, finally, Rhode Island protects any “reporter . . . or other
person directly engaged in the gathering or presentation of news for
any accredited” news outlet.147 This, of course, raises the questions: What is an “accredited” news outlet, and does a student outlet qualify? Legally, there is no such thing as an “accredited” outlet, because that kind of scheme would constitute licensing in violation of the First Amendment.148 Legislators most likely used the
word here to mean “good” or “professional.”
8. Covered Person Must Earn Livelihood from News Work,
Not Necessarily Employed by News Organization
Texas is the lone member of this category. Its statutes are semiprofessionalized, insofar as they focus on money earned from journalistic work.149 The laws cover journalists who, “for a substantial
1982). The court said it did not matter what the defendant thought he was, but rather
what the court believed his status to be. Id.
145
N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(B). It is worth noting that the New Mexico legislature passed a
journalist shield statute in 1973, but the New Mexico Supreme Court struck it down as
applied to courts and judicial proceedings, finding it to be in violation of the New Mexico
Constitution. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7(A), invalidated by Ammerman v. Hubbard
Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976).
146
N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(C). This makes the privilege more like a limited work-product
protection, rather than an absolute privilege.
147
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2016).
148
Lee, supra note 46, at 679 (“Lawyers, physicians, and psychotherapists are licensed.
This means that no one without a license may lawfully offer services reserved for those
professions. A hallmark of American free expression, however, is that every citizen may
publish without seeking permission from the government.”).
149
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 22.021–22.027 (West 2015); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2015).
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portion of [their] livelihood or for substantial financial gain,” gather and/or publish news and/or information.150 Presumably, the
“gain” required must be more than potential gain in the future
(e.g., gainful employment as a result of the skills developed by
working or interning with the news organization). A student could
argue that she earns a modest livelihood from her work as a journalist. But, overall, it is unclear how a court would evaluate a student’s financial situation, especially if the student was still a dependent, either legally or practically.151 No court has addressed
these issues.
9. Covered Person Must Be Employed by the News Media
This category is interesting because of its focus on actual employment, not just a connection with a news organization.152 Nevada’s shield covers any “editorial employee of any newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or television
station.”153 Oklahoma’s law protects “any individual employed
by” a “news service” that gathers and publishes news.154 Similarly,
the District of Columbia shield covers anyone “employed by the
news media in a news gathering or news disseminating capacity.”155
Finally, the Connecticut statute protects “any person who is or has
been an employee, agent or independent contractor of any” news
outlet.156 The remaining shield laws in this group—those of Delaware,157 Colorado,158 and Kansas159—follow a similar pattern.

150

See § 22.021(2); art. 38.11 § 1(2).
Would the gain be relative to what she earns herself, or what she earns plus what she
receives from her parents?
152
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (2015); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to 16-4704 (2016); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-480 to 60-485 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2015); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 2506 (2016).
153
NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275.
154
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(A)(7).
155
D.C. CODE § 16-4702.
156
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t(a)(2).
157
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4320(4).
158
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(1) (2016).
159
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480(a) (2016).
151
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These shields are notable because employment can mean many
things, including part-time or otherwise irregular, non-standard
employment relationships. For example, consider a student journalist who is under contract as an employee to produce one story
per year for a student newspaper in exchange for $10. That person
would satisfy the requirements of many statutes in this category.
However, if that same student produced ten stories per week for a
student newspaper as part of an academic course, she may
not satisfy the requirements.
10. Covered Person Must Be a Professional Journalist and
Meet Other Requirements
The final category includes two statutes that require journalists
to be “professional” and to satisfy other criteria.160 The New York
shield covers “a professional journalist” who, “for gain or livelihood, is engaged in” gathering and publishing news for an organization that “has as one of its regular functions” the “dissemination
[of news] to the public; [and] such person [must do so] either as a
regular employee or as one otherwise professionally affiliated for
gain or livelihood.”161 Similarly, the Florida shield applies to a
“professional journalist,” defined as a “person regularly engaged
in” both gathering and publishing news, “for gain or livelihood,
who obtained the information sought while working as a salaried
employee of, or independent contractor for,” a news organization.162 Courts may find the key word in “student journalist” to be
student, and thus distinguish students and professionals, leaving the
former without protections.163

160

See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2016); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2016).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (a)(6).
162
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a).
163
See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 44 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that if New
York’s shield law governed the question of whether a law student reporter qualified for
the privilege, the plaintiff’s argument that the privilege does not apply to the student may
be correct).
161
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B. Constitutional and Common-Law Protections
1. State Level
In all but one of the states lacking a shield statute—and even in
a few states that have one—it is possible to claim a reporter’s privilege through the common law or the federal or state constitutions.
For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho has recognized a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment and the state constitution, allowing a journalist to refuse to disclose confidential
sources.164 However, no Idaho court has addressed whether the
privilege covers student journalists, and the state does not have a
statutory shield.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa has recognized a qualified privilege under both the First Amendment and the state constitution that “protects confidential sources, unpublished information, and reporter’s notes.”165 The privilege covers anyone who
“falls within the class of persons qualifying for the privilege,”166 as
long as the information sought was obtained during the “newsgathering process.”167 Courts in the state, which lacks a statutory
shield, have not defined the terms “class of persons” and “newsgathering process,” though one trial court did extend the privilege
to a freelance journalist.168 It is unclear how student journalists
would be treated.
Massachusetts also lacks a statutory shield, and so far its courts
have declined to recognize one through the state constitution.169
However, some courts have applied a First Amendment balancing
164

In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985) (“We hold there is [a newsperson’s
qualified privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources] under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution.”).
165
Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97, 101–03
(Iowa 2002) (citing IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 310
(Iowa 1982); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1978)).
166
Id. at 101 (citing Lamberto, 326 N.W.2d at 309).
167
Id. (citing Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1987)).
168
Stanfield v. Polk Cty., No. CE 34-20125, 1990 BL 233, at *6 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 13,
1990).
169
See Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 438 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Mass. 1982); Ayash v. DanaFarber Cancer Inst., 706 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
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test to that end,170 and the state’s highest court once used a qualified common-law privilege to protect confidential sources in a civil
lawsuit.171 The courts have not addressed whether those privileges
apply to student journalists, though, and they have not fully addressed who qualifies to claim them.
Meanwhile, Mississippi, which lacks a shield statute, has recognized a privilege against compelled disclose of confidential information and sources, based on the First Amendment and the
state constitution.172 However, like Massachusetts, there are no
reported cases involving student journalists, and Mississippi courts
have not clearly articulated who qualifies to claim the privilege.
In Missouri, which does not have a statutory shield, the Court
of Appeals has recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege
against the compelled disclosure of confidential sources.173 But,
again, no cases have involved student journalists. Both Vermont174
and Virginia175 lack statutory shields, too, and base their privileges
on the First Amendment. They have not been applied judicially to
student journalists.
New Hampshire is notable because, even though it lacks a statutory shield, its highest court once affirmed a ruling that two stu170

Sinnott v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100, 586–87 (Mass. 1988); In re Promulgation of
Rules Regarding Prot. of Confidential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Mass. 1985)
(“This court has also noted that the method of case-by-case adjudication involves a
balancing between the public interest in every person’s evidence and the public interest in
protecting the free flow of information.” (citing Commonwealth, 438 N.E.2d at 809)); In re
Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466, 476–77 (Mass. 1980).
171
Sinnott, 524 N.E.2d at 583–84, 586.
172
Shield Laws, supra note 85.
173
State ex. rel. Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 655–56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
174
State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974) (“We hold that, when a
newsgatherer, legitimately entitled to First Amendment protection, objects to inquiries
put to him in a deposition proceeding conducted in a criminal case, on the grounds of a
First Amendment privilege, he is entitled to refuse to answer unless the interrogator can
demonstrate to the judicial officer appealed to that there is no other adequately available
source for the information and that it is relevant and material on the issue of guilt or
innocence.”).
175
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974) (“We believe that, as a
news-gathering mechanism, a newsman’s privilege of confidentiality of information and
identity of his source is an important catalyst to the free flow of information guaranteed
by the freedom of press clause of the First Amendment . . . . [W]e think the privilege of
confidentiality should yield only when the defendant’s need is essential to a fair trial.”).
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dent journalists for a college newspaper could claim a qualified privilege against disclosing the identity of confidential sources in a
criminal proceeding.176 The court failed to note explicitly that the
reporters worked for a student publication, but it based its decision
on the state constitution’s guarantee of freedom of the press.177 It is
likely, then, that at least college journalists could claim the
shield.178
In contrast, South Dakota lacks a statutory shield, and there is
only one instance in which a court recognized a privilege to protect
confidential information in a civil case.179 Adopting a qualified privilege over an absolute one, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
noted that there are certain circumstances in which “disclosure
may be appropriate or necessary.”180 Although the court adopted
five factors for trial courts to consider in their determination of
whether to compel disclosure,181 the court made little-to-no effort
in defining who qualifies for the privilege.182 That is still better,
however, than the situation in Wyoming, where there is neither a
statutory shield183 nor a reported case in which a court has recognized the privilege on any basis.
2. Federal Level
It is worth noting that there are federal cases involving student
journalists that could enable other people similarly situated to
claim a privilege in those jurisdictions, despite the lack of a federal
statute. These cases could be used as persuasive authority, even in
state courts. For example, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized a reporter’s privilege for a former freelance journalist who enrolled in the University of California, Los Angeles, film department, where he investi176

State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502–03 (N.H. 1982).
Id.
178
Id.
179
Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995).
180
Id. at 781–82.
181
Id. at 782. The court adopted a five-factor test from a case decided by the Supreme
Court of California. See id. (citing Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 632 (Cal.
1984)).
182
Id.
183
Reporter’s Privilege Guide: Rhode Island – Wyoming, supra note 86.
177
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gated the death of activist Karen Silkwood for a documentary.184
The company accused of causing Silwood’s death subpoenaed the
student journalist to compel him to produce his notes related to the
investigation.185
After considering whether the privilege extended to someone
who is not a “regular newsman,” the court applied a First
Amendment-based privilege, concluding that the student undertook investigative reporting for the preparation of a documentary
film.186 The court recognized that, though the student was not a
salaried reporter, he had a legitimate interest in protecting the
fruits of his labor.187 The court also noted the irony of the company’s argument that the student should be denied the privilege because he lacked journalistic qualifications, in the face of the great
efforts the company expended to obtain his work product.188
Additionally, the District Court for the Western District of
New York granted a qualified privilege to a law student writing for
a law school newspaper on a volunteer basis who was subpoenaed
by a former law professor challenging his termination.189 In Blum v.
Schlegel, the terminated professor sought the recording of an interview that the student had conducted with the associate dean.190
Though New York has a shield law,191 the court ruled that the evidence sought was relevant to federal constitutional violations alleged in the professor’s complaint, and thus the privilege would be
governed instead by federal common law.192 Considering the plaintiff’s argument that the privilege does not apply to a law student
because he does not qualify as a “professional journalist,” the
court stated that this point is irrelevant because the federal privi-

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 435–37 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436–37.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 436–37.
Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 43–44 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
Id.
See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2016).
Blum, 150 F.R.D. at 44.
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lege is broader than the state shield law.193 Instead, the proper inquiry is “how the person asserting the privilege intended to use the
information gathered.”194 If the information was gathered for the
purpose of dissemination, the court said, the privilege should be
available.195
In another federal case in New York, Persky v. Yeshiva University, the Southern District applied a First Amendment-based privilege to a student journalist who reported on a university employee’s claim that the institution had discriminated against her on
the basis of religion.196 The plaintiff tried to compel the student
journalist to reveal her confidential sources and notes,197 but the
court applied the privilege to the student based on the Second Circuit’s von Bulow opinion and the Western District of New York’s
Blum opinion.198 The court said the student journalist promised his
sources confidentiality and gathered all of the relevant information
with the intent to disseminate it.199 Thus, he could claim the privilege.200
On the opposite coast, in Jimenez v. City of Chicago, the District
Court for Western District of Washington allowed a journalism
graduate student at Northwestern University201 to claim the privilege.202 During the trial of a boy who was convicted of murder at
thirteen (and later sentenced to forty-five years in prison),203 the
193

Id. at 44–45. The New York shield law’s definition of a professional journalist
requires the person to engage in news gathering or preparation for “gain or livelihood.”
§ 79-h; see also supra Section II.A.10.
194
Blum, 150 F.R.D. at 45.
195
Id.
196
Persky v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 01-CV-5287, 2002 WL 31769704, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
197
Id. at *2.
198
Id. (citing von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987); Blum v.
Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 45 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
The school is now called the Medill School of Journalism, Media, Integrated
Marketing Communications. See Wendy Leopold, Medill Expands Name, NW. (Mar. 15,
2011),
http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2011/03/medill-nameexpansion.html [https://perma.cc/2YSS-LWHQ].
202
Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270–72 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
203
Id. at 1270.
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journalism student, Carolyn Nielsen, gathered documents related
to the case and published a story about the proceeding in a journalism school magazine.204 After graduation, Nielsen worked as a freelancer, and then became a journalism professor at Western Washington University.205 Years later, in 2009, the boy’s conviction was
reversed, and he filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago and
others.206 As part of the lawsuit, the plaintiff subpoenaed Nielsen’s
correspondence with him and a videotape of a deposition.207 When
Nielsen claimed a reporter’s privilege, the court, citing Shoen, said
that a First Amendment privilege was available, so long as the person claiming it gathered the materials at issue with the intent to
disseminate them.208 The court explicitly noted that other circuits
had extended the privilege to students, ultimately concluding that
Nielson was eligible for the privilege.209
III. LACK OF PROTECTION IS CONCERNING
Most state reporter’s privileges exclude student journalists or
make it difficult for such students to claim shield protections.210
Only two statutes explicitly reference students,211 and many shields
include non-student-friendly language, such as requiring the journalistic work to be done for “substantial financial gain,”212 or only
covering a “professional journalist.”213 Other definitions are so
ambiguous that it is difficult to say whether they would include
student journalists. For example, would a student journalist be
204

Id.
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 1271 (citing Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995); Shoen v. Shoen,
5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993)).
209
Id. at 1271–72 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977);
Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)) (“Given that other circuits have not
differentiated professional journalists from students in this context, this Court finds no
reason to deny her standing simply because she was a student when some of the
documents were created.”).
210
See supra Section II.A.
211
See supra Section II.A.1.
212
See supra Section II.A.8.
213
See supra Section II.A.10.
205
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“engaged in” or “connected with” a news outlet if she wrote for a
student paper?214 Would that outlet be considered “accredited”?215
And, if the newspaper published only four issues each year, would
those intervals be sufficiently “regular”?216
Moreover, the case law is sparse.217 Only a few jurisdictions
have reported cases involving privilege claims by student journalists.218 Beyond that, just a small minority of jurisdictions have reported cases addressing privilege issues at all, and those decisions
generally fail to address how student journalists would fare in future cases.219 In short, privilege protections for student journalists
are, at best, uncertain in most states.
The lack of protection is concerning because, as noted above,
student journalists play a vital role in meeting their communities’
needs for news and information.220 In four states, student journalists outnumber professional journalists who report on state legislatures.221 More generally, fulfilling news needs means candidly covering a range of public issues that might draw government responses—even subpoenas.222 At the college level alone, campusbased news organizations—and student collaborations with professional outlets—are filling some of the gaps created by the decline of
traditional state and local media.223 Such organizations cover the
states and towns where the schools are located.224 For example,
214

See supra Section II.A.4.
See supra Section II.A.7.
216
See supra Section II.A.7.
217
See supra Part II.
218
See supra Section II.B.
219
See supra Section II.B.
220
Peters & LoMonte, supra note 9; see also ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. &
STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., NEW SHIELD LAWS COULD LEAVE STUDENT JOURNALISTS,
BLOGGERS UNPROTECTED (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.eff.org/document/studentactivism-shield-laws [https://perma.cc/WQ4J-ZBHJ]; Anna Schiffbauer, Under the
Dome: As Professional News Outlets Vacate State Capitols Because of Budget Constraints,
Student Journalists Move in to Fill the Gap, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Mar. 24, 2015, 11:02
AM), http://www.splc.org/article/2015/03/under-the-dome [https://perma.cc/54KETC4X].
221
Schiffbauer, supra note 220.
222
Peters & LoMonte, supra note 9.
223
Id.
224
Id.
215
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Arizona State University operates Cronkite News, where students
cover public affairs in Phoenix, Arizona, Washington, D.C., and
Los Angeles, California,225 and Boston University runs the New
England Center for Investigative Reporting, where professional
journalists work with students to produce major stories.226
For years, too, there has been a growing consensus that journalism programs should transform themselves into “teaching hospitals” for gathering, producing, and distributing news.227 For example, in a 2009 report, the Knight Commission on the Information
Needs of Communities in a Democracy228 asserted that colleges
needed to enhance their roles as “hubs of journalistic activity.”229
And, in a 2012 open letter to university presidents, leaders of the
nation’s largest journalism foundations stated that journalism programs must “recreate themselves if they are to succeed in playing
their vital roles as news creators.”230

225

About Us, CRONKITE NEWS, https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/about-us/ [https://
perma.cc/6JYG-AMMF] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
226
New England Center for Investigative Reporting, BU COLLEGE COMM., http://
www.bu.edu/com/academics/internships-opportunities/opportunities-throughout-theus/new-england-center-for-investigative-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/65AD-2685] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2017).
227
See Lauren Klinger, Journalism Program Takes Lessons from Teaching Hospitals,
POYNTER (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.poynter.org/2013/journalism-program-takeslessons-from-teaching-hospitals/225227/
[https://perma.cc/Q5TE-BSHA];
Eric
Newton, Journalism Schools Aren’t Changing Quickly Enough, NIEMAN LAB (Sept. 10,
2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2012/09/eric-newton-journalism-schoolsarent-changing-quickly-enough/ [https://perma.cc/D2SU-FF8E].
228
The purpose of the Knight Commission—a panel composed of media, policy, and
community leaders—was to “assess the information needs of communities, and
recommend measures to help Americans better meet those needs.” The Knight
Commission on the Information Needs of Communities in a Democracy, ASPEN INST., https://
www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/communications-and-society-program/the-knightcommission-on-information-needs-of-communities-in-a-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/
8R48-3RNN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
229
KNIGHT COMM’N ON THE INFO. NEEDS OF CMTYS. IN A DEMOCRACY, INFORMING
COMMUNITIES: SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 36 (2009), https://assets.
aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/Informing_Communities_
Sustaining_Democracy_in_the_Digital_Age.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YQ8-WJ5K].
230
An Open Letter to America’s University Presidents, KNIGHT FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.knightfoundation.org/articles/open-letter-americas-university-presidents
[https://perma.cc/5365-778P].
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While student journalists make significant contributions
through independent reporting, they lack important legal protections. Recently, one student journalist was incarcerated for months
after refusing to reveal a source.231 The lack of protections for student journalists is plainly irreconcilable with watchdog journalism,
which is essential for informed communities.232 Thus, protecting
these journalists from disruptions in their classes, lives, and futures
is in the best interest of both professional journalists, who will need
to hire principled graduates in the future, and the public, which
needs good reporters for the free exchange of information. Lawmakers and judges should apply the privileges to student journalists
through legislative amendments and judicial recognitions to allow
student journalists, where warranted, to make promises of confidentiality with confidence.
CONCLUSION
Reporter’s privileges are as varied in application as they are
controversial in theory. While commentators, jurists, and legislators struggle to agree on the appropriate limitations and interpretations of the privilege, student journalists are often neglected or outright excluded. The majority of states offer some protection to
journalists, but most have crafted their laws or interpreted them—
intentionally or not—to exclude the growing and ever-important
population of student journalists. While more research is needed to
deduce the best solution to protect student journalists, it is clear
that they are vulnerable and in need of greater legal clarity to perform confidently their increasingly important roles.
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POYNTER (May 26, 2005), https://www.poynter.org/2005/watchdog-culture-why-youneed-it-how-you-can-build-it/67742/ [https://perma.cc/27BW-WK3Q].

2017]

A PAPER SHIELD?

801

